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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Whether plaintiffs claim is pre-empted by the Railway Labor Act.
This is an appeal from the trial court's "Order of Dismissal," (R. 92) which
granted Delta's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 33) However, Delta's Motion was
essentially a motion for summary judgment because Delta presented matters
outside the pleadings (specifically, the Pilot Working Agreement (R. 51)) that
were not excluded by the trial court. URCP 12(b).
Rulings made on summary judgment are reviewed for correctness with
no deference afforded the trial court. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d
104,107 (Utah 1991). When reviewing a dismissal under URCP 12(b)(6), the
material allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true, and the trial
court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Colman v. Utah State LandBd.,
795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). The issue on appeal was raised in plaintiffs
"Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss." (R. 67)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed an action for damages against Delta Air Lines, Inc.
("Delta"). (R. 1) Plaintiff also named Delta's managers, Robert Anderson
and Terry Cusick. (R. 1) However, the individual defendants were never
served. Delta was served and answered the Complaint. (R. 18)
Shortly after, Delta filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R. 33) Delta contended
that since plaintiffs employment was governed by a collective bargaining
agreement, namely, the Pilot Working Agreement, (R. 51) his claims were
pre-empted by the Railway Labor Act. (R. 37)
Specifically, Delta contended that its "right to investigate a pilot's
claim of illness emanates directly from specific provisions in the [Pilot
Working] Agreement." (R. 37) Delta claimed that the trial court "would be
required to interpret the [Pilot Working] Agreement." (Id.) Delta claimed that
as a result, "any purported state law claim is preempted by the [Railway
Labor Act]." (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition. (R. 67) Plaintiff
explained that he did not dispute Delta's right to investigate sick leave. (RR.
67-68) Significantly, plaintiff explained that Delta's sick leave investigation
did not prevent him from taking his ceremonial last flight. (R. 68)
2

Plaintiff explained that Delta withheld his flight privileges for reasons
that had nothing to do with its sick leave investigation. (R. 68) Plaintiff
explained that for this reason, his claim did not require interpretation of the
Pilot Working Agreement. (Id.)
Delta filed a Reply Memorandum. (R. 77) Thereafter, Delta's Motion
was submitted to the trial court for decision. (R. 84)
In a one-page Minute Entry, (R. 90) the trial court granted Delta's
Motion to Dismiss. The trial court concluded "that the plaintiff[']s claims
could not be resolved without some analysis of the terms and conditions of
plaintiff[']s rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement." (Id.)
An Order of Dismissal was entered by the trial court on December 20,
1999. (R. 92) Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on January 17, 2000. (R.
95) On March 16, 2000, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. (R.
101)
On June 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals made a Sua Sponte Motion for
Summary Disposition. The Court noted that "this is a multiple party case and
yet the order of dismissal only involved one defendant, Delta Airlines [sic]."
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The Motion was briefed by both parties. On June 30, 2000, the Court
entered its Order of Remand. (R. 103) The case was "temporarily remanded
to the trial court for consideration of Rule 54(b) certification...."
In order to solve the jurisdictional problem, plaintiff filed a Motion to
Dismiss Individual Defendants. (R. 112) Based thereon, the trial court
dismissed the action against the individual defendants with prejudice. (R.
121)
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Notice of Appeal (R. 123), and this case
was scheduled for briefing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff was a thirty-year veteran pilot of Delta. (R. 3, ^|8)

2.

By FAA regulation, pilots must retire by age 60. (R. 4, ^[16)

3.

Plaintiffs 60th birthday was January 3, 1997. (R. 4, f 17)

4.

Accordingly, plaintiffs last date of employment was January 3, 1997.
(R. 3,19)

5.

Delta observed a custom in the airline industry of permitting a retiring
pilot to take one last commercial flight as a ceremonial gesture. (R. 4,

118)
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6.

Delta confirmed the custom and plaintiffs right to a ceremonial last
flight in a letter to plaintiff dated September 30, 1996. (R. 4, f22)

7.

Plaintiff scheduled his last flight with the company many weeks in
advance of his retirement. (R. 5, ^23)

8.

It was scheduled for December 31, 1996 to January 2, 1996. (R. 5,1J24)

9.

On December 22, 1996, plaintiff was placed on a third consecutive
"short call" status starting December 23, 1996. (R. 6, |36)

10.

Plaintiff advised the Crew Scheduler that he was not feeling well. (R. 6,
137)

11.

Plaintiff got a call the next day (December 23,1996) from Delta's
Chief Pilot in Los Angeles. (R. 6, f46)

12.

Plaintiff was informed that he had been "suspended" starting December
22,1996 to January 2, 1997 for abusing sick leave policy. (R. 6, f47)

13.

The Chief Pilot knew that plaintiff was retiring on January 3, 1997 and
that he had planned his last, ceremonial flight for December 31, 1996 to
January 2, 1997. (R. 7,149)

14.

The Chief Pilot specifically told plaintiff that he was going to miss his
last, ceremonial flight. (R. 7, f48)
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15.

The Chief Pilot told plaintiff to be in Los Angeles the day after
Christmas (December 26, 1996) with a note from his doctor justifying
his sick leave. (R. 7, f 53)

16.

On December 24, 1996, plaintiff told the Chief Pilot that because of the
Christmas holiday, he could not get in to see his doctor until December
27, 1996. (R. 7,154)

17.

The Chief Pilot said nothing about that, but took the opportunity to
inform plaintiff that his status as line-check airman had also been
revoked. (R. 7, f 55)

18.

Plaintiff saw his doctor on December 27, 1996 and received a
certification of his condition. (R. 7, ^56)

19.

Plaintiff called the Chief Pilot immediately after seeing his doctor. (R.
7,157)

20.

Plaintiff was prepared to fax a copy of the doctor's certification. (R. 7,
1f58)

21.

However, the Chief Pilot left the office early that day for the weekend.
(R. 8, H61)

22.

Plaintiff flew to Los Angeles on Monday, December 30, 1996. (R. 8,
162)
6

23.

Plaintiff met that day with the Chief Pilot in Los Angeles who spoke
with the Chief Pilot in Atlanta over the telephone. (R. 8,163)

24.

At the meeting, plaintiff provided the Chief Pilots with all of the
justification for his sick leave. (R. 8, 164)

25.

The Chief Pilots took no action that day. (R. 9, 174)

26.

They knew that plaintiffs last flight was scheduled for the next day
(December 31, 1996). (R. 9,175)

27.

They knew that in order for plaintiff to make his last flight, they needed
to act that day (December 30, 1996). (R. 9, f 76)

28.

They purposefully waited another day before taking action. (R. 9, 178)

29.

They did this because they knew it would be too late for plaintiff to
make his ceremonial flight. (R. 9,179)

30.

Plaintiff missed his last flight because his flight privileges were not
restored until it was too late for him to make his last flight. (R. 9,181)

3 J!.

Plaintiff filed a "grievance" against the company as he thought he was
required to do by the Pilot Working Agreement. (R. 10,196)

32.

However, there was no way to restore his last flight since FAA
regulation prohibited him from flying after age 60. (R. 11,197)
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33.

He could not request any compensation for loss of his last flight. (R.
11,1198-99)

34.

All he could do was request that his record be cleared and that the
company issue him an apology. (R. 11, 1100)

35.

Plaintiffs grievance was heard by the Delta Pilots' System Board of
Adjustment. (R. 11,1101)

36.

Following a hearing, the Board ordered plaintiffs personnel files
"expunged of all correspondence and material relating to this case." (R.
11,1102)

37.

However, Delta made no apology. (R. 11,1103)

38.

During his thirty years employment with Delta, plaintiffs record was
spotless. (R. 3,110)

39.

He never had an accident; never failed a check-ride; and was never
disciplined by the company or the FAA. (R. 3,111)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff has stated state-law claims for civil conspiracy, intentional

infliction of emotional distress and breach of implied contract. Those claims
can be resolved without interpreting the Pilot Working Agreement. Plaintiffs
right to a ceremonial last flight does not appear in the Pilot Working
8

Agreement. It is the subject of custom and implied contract, which is not
based on and does not require interpretation of the Pilot Working Agreement.
Furthermore, plaintiff has alleged that his flight privileges were withheld for
reasons that had nothing to do with Delta's sick leave investigation. This was
the result of retaliatory action by Delta after plaintiff exercised sick leave.
For these reasons, plaintiffs state-law claims are not pre-empted by the
Railway Labor Act.
ARGUMENTS
I.

PLAINTIFF'S STATE-LAW CLAIMS ARE NOT BASED ON
AND DO DEPEND ON INTERPRETATION OF THE PILOT
WORKING AGREEMENT FOR THEIR RESOLUTION.
The United States Supreme Court has made plain that "not every

dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a
collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions
of the federal labor law."1 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, All U.S. 202, 211
(1985). Consequently, federal labor law, including the Railway Labor Act,
does not pre-empt "state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and
obligations, independent of a labor contract." Id. at 212.
1

It does not matter which Act is in question because the pre-emption provisions of the Railway Labor Act
are no broader than those of the Labor Management Relations Act. Fry v. Airline Pilots Ass'n. 88 F.3d 831,
836 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996).
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In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988),
the United States Supreme Court elaborated on the Allis-Chalmers test for
determining whether a state-law claim is pre-empted by federal labor law:
[Section] 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will
be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements,
and says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide
to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend
upon the interpretation of such agreements. In other words, even
if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would
require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the
state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the
agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the agreement for
§ 301 pre-emption purposes.
486 U.S. at 409-10 (emphasis added). See also Retherford v. AT&T
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 968 (Utah 1992).

Delta persuaded the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs action by
mischaracterizing his complaint. Onpg. 10 of its Memorandum, Delta
claimed that "[t]he crux of [plaintiffs] claim is his contention that Delta
improperly conducted an investigation based on its suspicion that he had
abused sick leave." (R. 45) Delta went on to say that "Peterson challenges
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both Delta's right to investigate and its conduct during its investigation of his
use of sick leave on December 22, 1996." (R. 47)2
Delta characterized plaintiffs claim in this manner to make it fit within
Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1992). In Mock, the
10th Circuit held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were pre-empted because
"[plaintiffs' claims all arose out of the manner in which [the
defendant] conducted its investigation of suspected employee
misconduct,....Under the [collective bargaining agreement
("CBA")], [the defendant] could conduct such an investigation of
suspected employee misconduct,....An analysis of whether [the
defendant] acted properly or not will inevitably require an
analysis of what the CBA permitted."
971F.2dat530.

However, Mock has been distinguished in two subsequent cases
involving claims of civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. In Albertson's, Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478 (10th Cir. 1993), the
10th Circuit held:
In the case before us, there is no doubt that many, if not all, of
the same factual issues and disputes will have to be resolved in
arbitrating the discharge under the CBA as in determining the
conspiracy or outrageous conduct claim. But, it is also true that
if plaintiffs can show defendants conspired to have [one of the
plaintiffs] arrested by fabricating her theft of groceries from her
2

This passage of Delta's Memorandum was underlined in pencil, probably by the trial court.
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employer, proving their outrageous conduct need not require
interpretation of or reference to the CBA.
982 F.2d at 1482.

The court held that the same was true in Garley v. Sandia Corporation,
236 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2001):
In the instant case, as in Albertson 's, the plaintiffs civil
conspiracy claim is predicated on an allegation that management
sought to frame the plaintiff for misconduct. Likewise here, as
in Albertson's, though addressing the conspiracy claim would
involve many of the same factual inquiries as assessing the
plaintiffs discharge under the CBA, because the focus of the
claim is on the defendant's alleged conspiring against the
plaintiff (an inquiry analytically distinct from whether its actions
were permitted by the CBA), we conclude that it is not
preempted by § 301.
236F.3datl212.

What was true for the civil conspiracy claim was also true for the claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Garley, the claim had two
factual predicates: (1) actions leading to plaintiffs dismissal; and (2)
"continued retaliatory acts." 236 F.3d at 1214.
The court concluded that "[determining whether [the employer's]
conduct during its investigation of [plaintiff] was 'outrageous,' an element of
the tort, requires construction of [the employer's] rights and obligations under
12

the CBA as that is the reference point against which [the employer's] action
must be scrutinized." 236 F.3d at 1214. As a result, this part of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim was pre-empted. Id.
However, the court also concluded that "[t]he fact that [plaintiffs]
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, to the extent that it is
based on [the employer's] actions leading to his dismissal, is preempted by §
301, does not require us to arrive at the same conclusion with respect to
[plaintiffs] second factual predicate for his claim - [the employer's] alleged
retaliatory actions taken following the arbitrator's ruling." 236 F.3d at 1214.
The court noted that "[w]e are not required to find preemption in every
conceivable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress which arises
from conduct in the work place." 236 F.3d at 1214 (quotation omitted). The
court concluded by stating "we find that to the extent [plaintiffs] claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on [the employer's]
retaliatory acts, we conclude that the claim is not preempted and reverse." Id.
Part of the reason for this is that the "conduct and motivation of the
employer" does not require "a court to interpret any term of a collectivebargaining agreement." Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407. The 10 Circuit has
similarly stated: "So long as the state law cause of action is concerned not
13

with the employer's contractual right to discharge the employee, but rather
with its motives in exercising that right, the CBA is not relevant and
preemption does not apply." Jarvis v. Nobel/Sysco Food Services Co., 985
F.2d 1419, 1427 (10th Cir. 1993).
Part of the reason is also that "if we were to hold § 301 preempts
plaintiffs state law claim [in Albertson 's\ that defendants conspired to set her
up for arrest and imprisonment just because the same factual disputes would
be present in arbitration under the CBA, it would seem to be virtually
impossible for a plaintiff to set out a state claim when the complaint also
states a federal §301 claim or a grievance procedure is commenced under the
CBA. We cannot reconcile such a conclusion with Lingle" 982 F.2d at 148283.
Though stated somewhat differently, the Utah Supreme Court has
seemingly reach the same conclusion. In Retherford v. AT&T, supra, the
court stated that "courts seem to have distinguished between situations in
which the defendant has misused his or her authority under a collective
bargaining agreement to torment the plaintiff and situations in which the
defendant has inflicted the distress through conduct that is purely personal
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and does not implicate the exercise of supervisory authority." 844 P.2d at 971
(citations omitted).
The court stated: "We find that this distinction has merit and apply it to
[plaintiffs] emotional distress claim.55 844 P.2d at 972. The court allowed
plaintiffs emotional distress claim "[t]o the extent that [plaintiffs] tort claim
is premised upon allegations of purely personal misconduct, as opposed to
misconduct under color of possible contractual authority,....55 Id.
There is little chance that Delta was acting under color of possible
contractual authority. Plaintiffs last flight does not appear in the Pilot
Working Agreement. It is the subject of custom and implied contract that had
nothing to do with Delta's sick leave investigation. If Delta withheld
plaintiffs flight privileges in retaliation for his exercise of sick leave, that is
evidence of "purely personal55 rather than official misconduct. There is no
other way to explain the Chief Pilot's statement "that [plaintiff] was going to
miss his last flight55 before the sick leave investigation concluded. (R. 7, ^48)
To make it clear, plaintiffs complaint is not with the sick leave
investigation. Plaintiff believes that Delta took some unauthorized action
during the sick leave investigation. (RR. 8-9,ffl[66-69,71, 73) However,
those instances were cited as evidence of Delta's motivation to later deny his
15

ceremonial last flight. Plaintiffs complaint centers on the loss of his
ceremonial last flight, not on unauthorized actions taken by Delta during the
sick leave investigation. Once the sick leave investigation concluded, there is
no way that Delta was acting under color of possible contractual authority
when it continued to withhold plaintiffs flight privileges.
This case is just like Lingle, supra. Even though defendants claimed
that they acted lawfully in terminating plaintiff under the terms of the CBA,
plaintiff claimed that their true motivation was to retaliate against her for
filing a worker's compensation claim. Plaintiffs claim was allowed to
proceed in the face of a claim of federal pre-emption. There is no difference
between Lingle (and the cases that follow it) and this case.
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), the Supreme
Court ruled that "a plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is
permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including statelaw contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collectivebargaining agreement." 482 U.S. at 396.
Plaintiffs ceremonial last flight was the subject of custom and implied
contract, (R. 4,ffl[18,22) not the Pilot Working Agreement. (R. 51)
Importantly, there has been no allegation that plaintiffs ceremonial last flight
16

was inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Pilot Working Agreement.
See Retherford, 844 P.2d at 968-69. For this reason, there is no need for the
trial court to make reference to the Pilot Working Agreement in resolving
plaintiffs claim.
At one point, Delta suggested that in order to avoid federal preemption, plaintiffs claims must be based on "independent statutory rights."
(R. 46, n.6) However, the Supreme Court made clear that Lingle 's claim
"was not based on any specific statutory provision,...." 486 U.S. at 407 n.6.
In Retherford, the Utah Supreme Court specifically upheld common law tort
claims (negligent employment; intentional infliction of emotional distress) in
the face of a federal pre-emption claim. 844 P.2d at 974. This claim of a need
for "independent statutory rights" is merely Delta's invention.
Finally, it does not matter that plaintiff filed a grievance with the Delta
Pilots' System Board of Adjustment. Plaintiff filed his grievance because he
thought he had to. (R. 10, TJ96) Plaintiff prevailed on the grievance, but the
Board did the only thing it could and cleared plaintiffs record of any
wrongdoing. (R. 11,fflflOO,102) The Board could not restore plaintiffs last
flight. (R. 11, |97) The Board could not award any damages. (R. 11, ffl[9899)
17

It is obvious that this action and plaintiffs grievance stand on
completely different footings. This action is plaintiffs only chance to seek
redress for the loss of his last flight. Besides, "the mere fact that [plaintiff]
might be able to grieve the employer under procedures provided in the
collective bargaining agreement is not sufficient in itself to conclude that
[plaintiffs] tort claims are preempted." Fry v. Airline Pilots Association, 88
F.3dat841.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs ceremonial last flight was based on custom and implied
contract, not on the Pilot Working Agreement. Notwithstanding, plaintiffs
last flight is perfectly consistent with the Pilot Working Agreement.
Therefore, plaintiffs last flight is "independent" of the Pilot Working
Agreement and not pre-empted by federal labor law. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
471 U.S. at 211.
The action complained of by plaintiff occurred after Delta completed or
should have completed its sick leave investigation. Delta should have
restored plaintiffs flight privileges at that time. It did not because, as
plaintiff has alleged, it wanted to make an example out of him to other pilots.

18

This was no part of Delta's contractual authority. Delta had the
authority to withhold plaintiffs flight privileges so long as its investigation
continued. However, if it continued to withhold plaintiffs flight privileges
when its investigation was satisfied and concluded, for reasons that had
nothing to do with a lawful sick leave investigation, this was purely the result
of purely personal misconduct and is not barred by federal pre-emption.
Delta's conduct should not be upheld simply because its managers did
not follow plaintiff around making threats. The law does not countenance
improper conduct simply because it was subtle. There is nothing to say that
subtle conduct may not be "outrageous." There is nothing to say that the
effect on plaintiff was not "severe."
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of Dismissal (R. 92) should be
REVERSED.
DATED t h i s ^ ^ k a y of August, 2001.
DALTON & KELLEY

By
fonald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Appellant
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